Security Council reform must be comprehensive and addressed as a single undertaking, including the question of veto, which is intricately linked to the other four clusters. We oppose deferring this issue or addressing it in isolation. We have repeatedly heard from colleagues… pic.twitter.com/nz1klxc6e4
— Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the UN (@PakistanUN_NY) April 14, 2026
United Nation GNP: Pakistan aligns itself with the statement delivered by the distinguished Permanent Representative of Italy on behalf of the Uniting for Consensus Group.
2. Together with a very large majority of member states, we firmly believe that the paralysis that we see often at the Security Council leading to inaction on crucial matters related to international peace and security stems from the misuse or abuse of the veto power by the permanent members.
This point of view is widely shared outside the UN in think tanks, academia, media and civil society. There is an overwhelming sentiment against the veto, and how actually this privilege is anachronistic today, along with the permanent membership. Yet, proposals to expand veto-wielding members persist. How can this dichotomy be defended? The problem cannot be the solution.
3. Pakistan’s policy position remains clear and consistent – veto should either be abolished or, at a minimum its use by the current permanent members severely restricted. Any expansion of the veto or addition of new individual permanent members is firmly opposed, as more vetoes would only aggravate the problem. This is a position of principle.
4. However, we also realize that the power of veto remains a reality of the Charter, and that the P5 are largely united in preserving this privilege, and would resist any dilution. Pakistan therefore supports efforts to enhance accountability and transparency in the use of the veto, including existing mechanisms enabling the General Assembly to review and debate it.
5. We believe that such initiatives are designed to reinvigorate the Charter functions of the General Assembly, and not impinge upon the IGN’s consideration of Security Council reform. Colleagues,
6. The recent pattern of veto use in the Security Council merits a reality check: notwithstanding the Veto Initiative, the frequency of vetoes has risen. This trend reinforces the need to explore measures that can increase the political cost of the veto within and outside the Council. Moreover, we all know that veto is primarily the power to block decisions of the Council. We need to address, and balance this blocking power, through more democratic means.
7. In our view, the most realistic way to raise the political cost of veto, and to counter balance its blocking power, is not by creating new vetoes, but by increasing the number of elected members of the Security Council. Increased number of elected members will tilt the balance away from the permanent members. This is the reality. Not the counterintuitive claim by some, primarily the aspirants, that increasing the number of elected members will not lead to rebalance in the Council.
Accordingly, in a reformed Council with more elected members, the burden of vetoing a resolution will increase markedly as it would be countering the wishes and position of an even higher number of members with affirmative votes in favour of a resolution. Keeping the current ratio, 16 affirmative votes would be required in a Council of say 26. We can agree on a higher ratio say 17 or 18 affirmative votes required. This is how the veto’s blocking power can be balanced, not through another undemocratic veto, but through the collective weight of non-permanent members.
8. When a permanent member blocks action that was backed by a broad majority, the veto becomes more isolated and harder to justify, increasing accountability and reputational costs.
9. The power of veto also empowers the permanent members to influence the outcome of Council decisions once they are aligned on a certain issue. They only need to persuade four other members to get a resolution adopted. By enhancing the number of affirmative votes through elected members, the power of the permanent members to influence decisions will be reduced as it would now be required to bring a greater number of members on board, thereby enhancing broader representation.
10. Now as compared to this, imagine a Council of 11-13 permanent members, and the ensuing chaos in decision making and the effectiveness of the Security Council. Colleagues,
11. Another concrete way of preserving collective interests is to reach an understanding as part of a reformed Council that would require concurrence of all members of a region, for adoption of any resolution relating to that region. This would on one hand, raise the political cost of casting a veto on any situation related to that region. And on the other hand, even more importantly, this will strengthen regional ownership in decision making.
It could be of particular interest to regional groups such as Africa that is increasingly asserting a regional perspective through its representatives on the Council – which is fundamentally different from the pursuit of individual interest and privilege by others. Such an arrangement can also apply to the Arab group. Co-Chairs, 13. Security Council reform must be comprehensive and addressed as a single undertaking, including the question of
veto, which is intricately linked to the other four clusters. We oppose deferring this issue or addressing it in isolation. We have repeatedly heard from colleagues since this morning the emphasis on core and agreed principles of democracy, representation, accountability, effectiveness and transparency as the foundation for reform. Veto, in our view, runs counter to each one of these principles. We must seriously reflect on this contradiction. That is why we say if we want Reform for All, there should be Privilege for None.
