Comparative Anatomy of Hydro-Politics through Jordon and Indus

For decades, conflicts in the region have revolved around petroleum deposits, pipelines, and shipping lanes. Today, however, an equally momentous contest is unfolding over rivers, reservoirs, desalination plants, and hydraulic infrastructure. In the contemporary era of climate change and increasing water scarcity, the ability to control freshwater is becoming a form of geopolitical leverage that rivals military strength. Water, therefore, is not only an environmental issue or a developmental resource but has also grown into an instrument of statecraft. Water has replaced oil as the greatest strategic resource in the Middle East.

Perhaps the best example of this change can be seen in the Jordan River Basin and the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. More significantly, it provides a window into the future of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) for South Asia.

The Jordan River basin, shared by Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Syria, reflects a broader struggle over boundary, sovereignty and survival. The treaty established a system of seasonal pumping, water transfers, storage, quality preservation and joint administration through a Joint Water Committee. It was based on mutual allocations in the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers and the Araba/Arava groundwater. Israel’s upper riparian and territorial advantages, augmented by its control over most of the basins’ water infrastructure after 1967, have given it major strategic leverage. While Jordan, being one of the world’s most water-scarce countries, relies on durable cross-border water supplies for its survival. Palestine, on the other hand stays incapable of exercising equal authority over most of its own water resources and Syria’s position has gradually declined after years of civil war. As a result, political asymmetry rather than hydrology governs the river course.

The conflict has never been only about water but rather about dominance and power.
The river basin also depicts an eminent paradox. Despite deep political animosity, Israel and Jordan signed the 1994 peace treaty, integrating detailed provisions on water sharing. Through a joint water committee, seasonal allocations and constant technical coordination, both parties committed to cooperation over an indispensable resource. Regardless of deteriorating diplomatic relations, the water kept flowing and cooperation only flourished because of the need for mutual dependence. 

However, for more than six decades, the Indus Waters Treaty remained one of the most notable examples of institutional resilience in international relations. Ratified in 1960 under World Bank auspices, the agreement divided the Indus River system between India and Pakistan while forming the permanent Indus Commission to ensure its implementation. It managed to outlast wars of 1965, 1971, 1999, periods of military dictatorship, and prolonged diplomatic breakdowns. Water commissioners kept meeting even when diplomats withdrew, embassies shut down and bilateral relations collapsed. This treaty wittingly kept water management away from politics, establishing that technical cooperation could outlast and endure geopolitical belligerence.

However, India’s decision to hold the treaty in abeyance has marked it as a major divergence from decades of practice and the strategic landscape of South Asian hydro politics. Albeit the practical repercussions remain restricted by infrastructure and international law, the political message was clear that water has been coined as coercive diplomacy. Like the Jordan basin, the Indus had turned into an institution via which political disputes could be voiced. 

The similarities between the two basins are noticeable. Firstly, the conflict led both rivers to become strategic assets. In the Jordan basin, water demonstrates the Israel-Palestine conflict while in the Indus basin, it illustrates the unresolved Kashmir dispute. Geography further substantiates these asymmetries. Where Israel exercises substantial influence through territorial control, sophisticated water technology and hydraulic infrastructure, India retains the advantage of an upper riparian state and Pakistan stands highly reliant on downstream flows. Therefore, geography becomes political capital in both cases. 

This phenomenon represents the concept of hydro hegemony formulated by Mark Zeitoun and Jereon Warner. Their framework posits that dominance over shared rivers goes beyond dams and geography as it also includes legal narratives, technological superiority, diplomatic influence and administrative capability. Hydro hegemony can be seen in practice in Israel through military and technological primacy. While India increasingly practices legal and upstream leverage with the Indus system. Its capacity to influence flow grants it a strategic benefit that neither degree of conventional military power can fully replicate.

Consequently, treaties manage conflict but seldom resolve it.  Though the Israel-Jordan agreement lessened tensions over water and the Indus Water Treaty effectively manages the river system, both remained unsuccessful in settling broader regional disputes and political differences. 

Climate change will escalate further tensions, making fresh water an increasingly depleted strategic resource due to melting Himalayan glaciers, declining river flows, anomalous rainfall and growing populations. Still, the debates involving IWT stay confined to the twentieth century, where policymakers’ rhetoric emphasizes whether the treaty shall survive rather than focusing on how it should evolve in this era of climate change, satellite hydrology, AI and cyber threats. 

Also Read: Beyond Borders: The Missing Dimension in Conflict Resolution

Pakistan should internationalize the conflict by pursuing a UN General Assembly resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of India’s unilateral abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty. Simultaneously, it should invest in hiring and consulting retired ICJ judges and expert international law jurists, and strenuously pursue remedies before the Treaty’s Court of Arbitration, while framing India’s actions as a dangerous precedent that undermines international law, transboundary water governance, and regional security. The Jordan and Indus basins demonstrate how power, law and political will ultimately control shared waterways. To protect the Indus Waters Treaty and uphold the sanctity of international law over unilateral duress, Pakistan must combine institutional resilience with legal diplomacy as climate change and geopolitical rivalry worsen.